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[Crim. No. 4823. In Bank. Dec. 17, 1947.] 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. ROBERT V. McRAE, 
Respondent. 
(1] Sodomr-Evidence-Accomplices.-A IS-year-old youth who 
knows that the act of sex perversion denounced by Pen. Code, 
§ 288a, is wrongful and who willingly par~icipates therein, i 
is an accomplice. 
(2] Criminal Law - Preliminary Examination - Examination.-
While a committing oagistrate should receive the testimony 
of an accomplice with caution and distrust, he may neverthe-
less believe the testimony of the accomplice and conclude 
therefrom that there is probable cause to believe defendant 
guilty of a public offense to which he should be held to answer. 
[8] Id.-Prelimi!lary Proceedings-Holding to Answer-Sdicient 
Cause.-A magistrate can hold a defendant to answer on the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice since Pen. Code, 
§ 1111, prohibits only a conviction based solely on such testi-
mony and is in harmony with the principle that less evidence 
is required to support a determination of probable cause for 
a commitment than a determination of guilt for a ccnviction. 
[1] See 8 Cal.Jur. 173; 2~ Cal.JUT. 400; 48 Am.JUT. 51;2. 
J4cK. Dig. References: [1] Sodomy, § 11; [2] Criminal Law, 
1164; [3,4J Criminal Law, § 175. . 
) 
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[4] Id.-Preliminal'J' Proceedings-Bolding to Answer-Su1ficient 
Cause.-In determining that there is probable cause to hold 
a defendant, a magistrate is not bound by the rule that there 
must be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of a defendant, and 
he may commit a 'defendant, even though there may be doubt 
as to' his guilt. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County setting aside an information. Raymond T. 
Coughlin, JUdge. Reversed. . 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Ruth Bernfeld and 
Clarence A. Linn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. 
Peter Mannino and C. K. Curtright for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Respondent was charged in an informa-
tion with violating section 288a of the Penal Code. The 
only evidence at the preliminary hearing was the testimony 
of the complaining witness. The magistrate held respondent 
to answer. The People appeal from an order of the su-
perior court granting respondent's motion under section 995 
of the Penal Code to set aside the information on the ground 
that he was committed without reasonable or probable cause. 
Respondent contends that the complaining witness was an 
accomplice and that his testimony, which was uncorroborated, 
could not support a determination by the magistrate under 
section 872 of the Penal Code that there was sufficient cause 
to believe respondent guilty of the offense charged. Respon-
dent relies on section 1111 of the Penal Code, which pro-
vides: •• A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of 
an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evi-
dence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the com-
mission of the offense .... " Appellant contends that the 
complaining witness was not an accomplice and that even if 
he was, his uncorroborated testimony could support the com-
mitment, since section 1111 prohibits only a conviction based 
SOlely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
[1] According to his testimony the complaining witness 
submitted to the act committed upon him without resisting 
or objecting to respondent's conduct. He was 15 years of 
age, and there is nothing in his testimony to indicate that 
(4] See 7 CaLJur. 982. 
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he lacked normal mentality. Since his testimony shows that 
he knew that the act was wrongful and that he willingly 
participated therein, it follows that he was an accomplice. 
(People v. Robbins, 171 Cal. 466, 472 [154 P. 317] ; People v. ' 
Tenner, 67 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [154 P.2d 9] ; People v. Bey- . 
nolds, 26 Cal.App.2d 219, 221 [79 P.2d 150] ; People v. Casey, 
79 Cal.App. 295, 300 [249 P. 525] ; see People v. McCollum, 
214 Cal. 601, 602 [7 P .2d 301].) . 
It was held in In ,.e Schwitalla, 36 Cal.App. 511 [172 P. 
617]. that a magistrate can hold a defendant to answer upon 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. "While a 
defendant cannot be convicted upon the uncorroborated testi-
mony of an accomplice, the testimony of an accomplice is 
admissible, and is proper to be considered, and we think it 
sufficient to make it appear that there is a 'probability' that 
a defendant has been guilty of the offense charged against 
him. " (36 Cal.App. 511, 512.) This case was followed by 
thE' Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Curreri v. Vice, 77 F.2d 130. A Minnesota statute that also 
required corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice to 
support a conviction was similarly construed in State v. Jef-
frey, 211 Minn. 55 [300 N.W. 7]. 
Respondent contends that the Schwitalla case was erroneous 
and should be disapproved, on the ground that it construed 
section 1111 according to its literal terms without regard 
to its underlying policy that testimony of an accomplice 
mllst be regarded with distrust. He contends that this policy 
governs the testimony of an accomplice at a preliminary 
ht'aring as well as at a trial and that a commitment, like a 
conviction, cannot be based on the uncorroborated testimony 
of an accomplice. Since the testimony of an accomplice 
comes from an untrustworthy source and may be given in 
expectation of immunity, it must be received by a jury with 
caution and distrust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061 (4); People .. 
v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 653, 654 [140 P.2d 828], and cases : 
there cited.) [2] A committing magistrate should likewise 
receive the testimony of an accomplice with caution and dis-
trust. A committing magistratt' may nevertheless believe the 
testimony of an accomplice and conclude that there is probable 
caust' 10 believe defendant guilty of a public offense to which 
he should be held to answer. 
[3] Section 1111 supplements the policy that testimony 
of an accomplice shan be regarded with distrust by barring 
DrC'. 1947] PEOPLE tJ. McRAE 
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a conviction of a defendant based solely upon the uncor-
roborated testimony of an accomplice, even though such testi-
mony may convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"The requirement of section 1111 of the Penal Code is in 
addition to the requirement of the doctrine of reasonable 
doubt; it in effect says that even though the jury are con-
vinced to a moral certainty that the defendant is guilty, 
yet they must acquit him if the testimony of the accomplice 
is not corroborated by other evidence, which connects him or 
tends to connect him with the offense charged." (People v. 
Dillon, 68 Cal.App. 457, 477 [229 P. 974]; see People v. 
Clough, 73 Cal. 348, 353 [15 P. 5] ; People v. Negra, 208 Cal. 
64 [280 P. 354] ; 8 Cal.Jur. 173; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evi-
dence, 11th ed. 1225.) Thus, by prohibiting a conviction 
based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accom-
plice, section 1111 precludes a result that might otherwise 
follow from such testimony. It is explicit and complete 
in defining the result that it precludes. In restricting its 
prohibition to a conviction, section 1111 is in harmony with 
the principle that less evidence is required to support a de-
termination of probable cause for a commitment than a de-
termination of guilt for a conviction. [4] It is settled that 
in determining that there is probable cause to hold a de-
fendant, a magistrate is not bound by the rule that there 
must be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of a defendant, 
and that he may commit a defendant, even though there may 
be doubt as to his guilt. (People v. Nagle, 25 Ca1.2d 216, 222 
[153 P.2d 344] ; People v. Tallman, 27 Ca1.2d 209, 212 [163 
P.2d 857] ; People v. Mitchell, 27 Ca1.2d 678, 681 (166 P.2d 
10].) 
The order appealed from is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J OJ and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. As held in the majority opinion, 
the complaining witness is an accomplice; also, as stated in 
the majority OpiniOll, the only evidence received at the pre-
liminary hearing was the testimony of the accomplice. Such 
testimony, uncorroborated, was wholly incompetent for the 
proof of any fact (Pen. Code, § 1111; 22 C.J.S. 1418, 
§ 813b; State v. Smith (1903), 138 Ala. 111 [35 So. 42, 100 
Am.St.Rep. 26]); standing uncorroborated the status of the 
lSS PEOPLE 11. McRAE 
case as to proof of guilt, probable cause, or any other fact· 
is exactly the same as though no evidence whatsoever had~; 
been adduced.~: 
The majority opinion errs, therefore, in applying the pre-
liminary hearing rule as to quantum or persuasiveness of 
proof to a situation where there is no proof. I have no 
quarrel with the rule itself, which is that in a preliminary 
examination proceeding it is not necessary that a defendant·· 
be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt j that it is suffi- .. 
cient to warrant binding him over for trial if upon the proof 
it is reasonable to believe that the defendant is guilty of the 
offense charged (People v. Mitchell (1946),27 Ca1.2d 678, 681 
[166 P.2d 10], and cases there cited). Under this rule, even 
though the committing magistrate may view the testimony of 
an accomplice with caution, suspicion and doubt, he may 
legally, if the accomplice's testimony is corroborated, hold 
the defendant to answer. But if the testimony of the accom-
plice is left wholly uncorroborated and there is no other evi-
dence of guilt then there is no competent evidence at all 
upon which the order of commitment can be based. 
The majority opinion cites and relies upon In,.8 Schwitalla 
(1918), 36 Cal.App. 511, 512 [172 P. 617], wherein it is 
said that "While a defendant cannot be convicted upon the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the testimony of 
an accomplice is admissible, and is proper to be considered, 
and we think is sufficient to make it appear that there is a 
'probability' that a defendant has been guilty of the offense 
charged against him." In my estimation, the quoted statement 
is wholly erroneous and should be disapproved. Both the 
Schwitalla opinion and the majority opinion here err in fail-
ing to recognize that in dealing with accomplices' testimonies 1 
courts may be confronted with either of two materially differ-
ent situations. One of those situations involves testimony which 
is competent and admissible but the weight of which is im-
paired; the other situation relates to testimony as to the weight 
of which there can be no question because it is wholly incom-
petent and cannot be considered at all. 
Thus, as to the first type of situation, where a witness is 
shown to be an accomplice but his testimony is corroborated, 
his testimony is I}ompetent and admissible but the weight of 
it is impaired by the fact that he is an accomplice. The 
fact that he is an· accomplice in itself impeaches him as a 
witness but when corroborated his testimony becomes com-
) 
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petent and may be given whatever relative weight the trier 
of fact determines. But as to the second class of situation, 
where an admitted accomplice is permitted to testify and his 
testimony is left wholly uncorroborated, there can be no ques-
tion as to the weight to be accorded his testimony; it is en-
titled to no weight whatsoever; it should be stricken from 
the record; it is wholly incompetent for the proof of any 
fact in a criminal case. "Where the statutes forbid a con-
viction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,· 
it is held to be the duty of the court to direct an acquittal 
where there is no corroboration within the requirements of 
the statute, and even though corroboration is not required 
by statute, it is held to be within the discretion of the trial 
court to direct an acquittal where the evidence consists solely 
of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." (22 
C.J.S. 1418, § 813b.) 
There is no satisfactory basis for holding that evidence 
which, in the accumulated wisdom of the law, is wholly in-
competent to prove any fact in the superior court, or to be 
considered at all therein, shall be received and accepted as 
the sole and complete proof of every essential fact in the 
committing court. Again, I emphasize, we have here no 
question as to quantum or degree of proof; we have a total 
absence of any proof. The exact point now before us was 
before the Supreme Court of Alabama in 8tate v. 8mith 
(1903), supra, 138 Ala. 111 [35 So. 42, 100 Am.St.Rep. 26] ; 
the statute of Alabama is substantially the same as ours. That 
court said, "The above conclusion leaves but one question 
in the case. That is whether the uncorroborated testimony 
of an accomplice may be sufficient to show probable cause to 
believe that a felony has been committed, and that the party 
under inquiry is guilty thereof. . . . It is to be noted that 
this statute in terms operates only to prevent convictions of 
felony on the testimony of an accomplice. It does not in 
terms apply to preliminary examinations, nor to trials on 
habeas corpus, nor to the exclusion of a finding of probable 
cause for believing that an offense has been committed, and 
that the accused is guilty thereof, on such examination or 
trial. Yet, in our opinion, its effect is to stamp a policy upon 
the administration of the law in this connection which cannot 
be carried out unless it be given operation upon cases where 
the inquiry is probable cause vel non, as well as where the 
inquiry is as to absolute guilt. The statute infects the 
) 
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testimony of accomplices with such absolute infirmity as: 
that not only may the citizen be not convicted upon it, but" 
as also that he should not be deprived of his liberty in" 
anticipation of a final trial upon it. A consideration of: 
practicabilities in the administration of the criminal law,; 
so to speak, would seem to enforce the same conclusion. Why" 
should the citizen be held to the trial jury, or indicted by 
the grand jury, on testimony upon which no petit jury could 
possibly convict him' What good end could be served bY' 
such a proceeding' Can there be said to be even probable 
cause shown in any case by testimony which the law expressly 
and pooitively declares to be insufficient to support a con-
viction f We think not. . . • To hold him would be a vain' 
and useless thing, involving his incarceration not as a pUnish~­
ment for crime and not really to the end that he should be 
tried for a crime charged of his probable guilt of which 
there is evidence to prove, but at the best upon a mere specu-
lation that evidence may be found to corroborate that of the 
accomplice. The evidence before the probate judge in this 
case tending to show the guilt of the petitioner was that of 
the accomplice alone and uncorroborated. The judge correct-
ly discharged the petitioner, and his order to that effect is 
affirmed." (See, also, In,.e MitcheZZ (1905),1 Cal.App. 396, 
401 [82 P. 374]; Ez parte OzZey (1915), 38 Nev; 379 [149 
P. 992, 994].) 
As in State v. Smith, .upra, the order of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
15, 1948. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
